This is a new study which examines whether the determinants and the forms of compensation in new versus old economy US firms are the same over time and if the structure of compensation for executives in both groups changes after the NASDAQ crash and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley act.
I. Introduction
In this new study, we examine the determinants and the forms of executive compensation of new versus old economy US firms over time. We focus our research on providing answers to the following questions: Are the determinants of executive compensation for new versus old economy firms the same? Are there significant differences between the compensation value and the forms of executive compensation in new versus old economy firms? Does the form of executive compensation change after the NASDAQ crash and the enactment of the SarbanesOxley act?
According to Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2000) and Murphy (2003) , new economy firms are defined as firms competing in the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking fields and as per several researchers such as Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003) , Anderson, Banker and Ravidran (2000) , Murphy (2003) , Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) and most recently Chen and Hung (2006) , the new economy firms are fundamentally different in terms of many characteristics they possess compared to the old economy firms.
The present studies on executive compensation present some limitations which offer a motivation for the current inquiry. One of the limitations is that there is only one study, by Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) , which analyzes the executive compensation for both new and old economy firms, but it is confined to the English market only. The other limitation is that most studies focus on the preponderance of stock options as a form of executive compensation, without analyzing the remaining components of the compensation. With the exception of the study developed by Murphy (2003) , all other studies on executive compensation analyze small periods of time; therefore, the conclusions achieved by these studies must be validated for a longer period of time.
Given that inherent differences exist between new and old economy firms, we believe that executive compensation between old versus new firms may be influenced by different factors, and the trends in terms of compensation may also be different over time. We also believe that the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002 significantly changed the form of compensation for executives in the new and old economies because a significant number of restrictions in terms of corporate governance were developed.
We also deal with the old problem in executive compensation literature as to what is the best variable to measure the impact of the firm size: LN (assets), LN (market value), LN (sales) or these variables without a natural logarithm. Effectively, firm size is described as one of the most important variables to explain the executive compensation; nevertheless, generally in the mind of the researchers, there exists a doubt if using one of the above variables, at the exclusion of other variables, will produce inferior results. To solve this problem, we use the Principal Component method and extract a factor that is the best combination of the three variables to measure the firm size.
Our results reveal that the number of executives in new economy firms is considerably smaller than the number of executives in old economy firms. Most of the new economy executives are from firms associated with Prepackaged Software (26,02%), Semicondutor and Related Devices (17,29%), Computer Programming, Data Processing (9,46%) and Telecommunications (7,50%).
Executives from new economy firms always receive on average more than those from old economy firms, but the difference in total compensation has reduced in recent years. Executive compensation in the new economy firms consists of more than 50%, and in the case of old economy firms more than 30%, of stock options between 1999 and 2001. After that period, with the NASDAQ Crash and the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, new and old economy firms instituted a change in the structure of the components of the executive compensation, reducing the use of stock options and increasing the use of bonus and restricted stocks.
We also find that the factors that explain executive compensation in new versus old economy firms are generally different, and in the case of the variables that are the same, our tests generally rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients related to these common factors are equal.
New economy total executive compensation is influenced by firm size, the ratio of the number of stock option vested but not exercised and executive stock ownership, whereas the old economy executive's total compensation is influenced by firm size, executive ownership, one year total return to shareholders and 5 years annual growth rate of firm net income.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the literature review and develops the research questions. Section III describes the data, sample selection and statistics. Section IV presents the research design. Section V describes the empirical results, and Section VI presents the conclusions.
II. Literature Review and Research Questions
Anderson, Banker and Ravidran (2000), Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003) , Murphy (2003) and most recently Chen and Hung (2006) analyze the issue of executive compensation but only for new economy firms. Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) investigate the executive compensation both for new and old economy firms in England but only for a period of two years.
All the studies that analyze new economy executive compensation focus their attention basically on one component of the executive compensation, stock options, at the expense of other components of the executive compensation. As discussed earlier, in this inquiry we take a comprehensive and current view of issues related to executive compensation.
Use of stock options had been a common and predominant form of executive compensation; therefore, several studies focused on this form of compensation. There are multiple reasons for firms to award stock options to their executives. Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) believe that stock options are given to the new economy executives for aligning the interests of shareholders with the goal of executives, reducing the agency costs, achieving beneficial tax gains for the company and the employees, and attracting and retaining executives with significant knowledge of new technologies. Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003) are of the view that new economy firms give stock options to executives because the firms have difficulty generating enough cash flow to pay high salaries to executives. Murphy (2003) thinks that a large group of big companies competes in the market for high quality executives. The compensation contracts that they give to this kind of executives forces the other companies to use the same structure of compensation, inclusion of stock options as a major component of compensation package. Another reason invoked is related to what the author calls the "perceived-cost-view"; in other words, there is the wrong perception that executives compensated with stock options constitute a cheap form of compensation
From the prior studies, we know that until 2000 executives from the new economy firms were predominantly paid with stock options. However, the most import fraudulent bankruptcy cases, like Enron, WorldCom, are indirectly related to the significant number of stock options granted to the executives. We believe that the NASDAQ crash and the Sarbanes-Oxley act changed the components of compensation for executives in both new and old economy firms due 6 to the introduction of new rules in the market place. The new rules contain provisions which have a significant impact on the benefits and compensation of public company executives.
Therefore, given the above historical context we find reason to empirically test whether the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 changed the structure of executive compensation, and if it did whether or not the impact of these major events was the same for the executive compensation of new versus old economy firms.
According to Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003) , Murphy (2003) and Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) , new economy companies differ from old economy companies because they present higher growth taxes of sales increase; they spend more money in research and development; they present low ratios of book-to-market value; they offer lower dividends per share and a high volatility of share returns. They still hold a smaller number of employees, a reduced market value and smaller accounting returns than old economy firms. In addition, they provide a larger compensation relative to capital ownership, have a higher percentage of stock options and a higher percentage of the volume of stock options not exercised related to the total number of company shares.
Furthermore, Chen and Hung (2006) express the idea that companies listed on NASDAQ have small boards, and the founder is usually the CEO. They have large shareholding of insiders, and the CEOs usually accept lower cash compensation and higher option compensation in order to convince shareholders of managerial commitment and future profitability.
Based on these differences, we also develop the idea that if new and old economy firms have different characteristics, these characteristics can lead generally to differences in terms of the factors that explain executive compensation. We also believe that even if some of the factors are equal, their intensity can be different. To develop the sample used in this study, we apply a few restrictions. First, we remove all the executives whose sum of salary and bonus was equal to zero, in other words, those who received neither salary nor bonus during the year, receiving instead some other remuneration types. We also exclude all those executives whose total compensation is equal to zero. To achieve this final sample we exclude 272 items of compensation related to executives that received compensation from more than one company. We delete the compensation values from the company for which the executives worked less time.
III-
Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with 1982 as the base year, we adjust the monetary variables for inflation.
In order to distinguish between executives from new and old economy firms, we use the
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The ExecuComp version is from 06-2006. methodology of Murphy (2003) , who considers firms from the new economy with SIC codes 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372 and 7373 and firms from the old economy with SIC codes lower than 4000 unless categorized as new economy firms. Notes: To distinguish between executives from new and old economy firms, we used the methodology of Murphy (2003) that considers firms from new economy those with SIC code 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371 , 7372 e 7373 and firms from old economy those with SIC code less than 4000
Statistics
and not yet categorized with new economy. BONUS is the dollar value of bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the executive officer during the fiscal years. STOCK OPTIONS is the aggregate value of stock options granted to the executive during the fiscal year as valued using S&P`s Black-Scholes methodology. RESTRICTED STOCKS is the value of restricted stock granted during the year (determined as of the date of the grant). LTIP is the amount paid out to the executive under the company's long-term incentive plan. These plans measure company performance over a period of more than one year ( In our view, the change from stock options to restricted stock may be due to the fact that both are compensation components associated with performance of a firm, whereas salary is not dependent upon performance. More precisely, when a firm grants stock options to the executives, these options can be cashed in only after a significant number of years (generally 3 to 10 years) and only if the market price is higher than the exercise price. Thus, executives have an incentive to manipulate the firm accounting data to influence the stock price and to refrain from sending less positive information to the market about the future performances of the firm (Povel, Singh 3 Restricted stocks are stock subject to restrictions on sale and risk of forfeiture until vested by continued employment. Restricted stock typically vests in increments over a period of several years. Dividends or dividend equivalent rights may be paid, and award holders may have voting rights, during the restricted period.
and Winton (2007), Yermack (1997) and Hu and Noe (2001) Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) to evaluate the contracts offered to executives in a context of strategic competition between products and evaluation of relative performance, and by Fields and Fraser (1999) to unmask the commercial banks when they attributed compensations to link executives to the performances and also Chen and Hung (2006) .
LN (Short Term Compensation) is the LN (salary+bonus)
. Salary and the bonus are considered short-term remunerations, and they are usually received in money. We used this variable like Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) and Chen and Hung (2006) .
Finally we also used LN (Option Ratio). We define option ratio as the value of options received by the executive divided by the total compensation and this variables was also used by Chen and Hung (2006) .
Each one of these dependent variables will be confronted separately with a group of independent financial and governance variables with the intention of finding, in a more 
A. Independent Variables
We use two sets of independent variables, financial and governance, as described below.
A.1-Financial Variables
Generally, the firm size in executive compensation literature is used as one of the following variables: LN (MKTVAL), that is the natural logarithm of the market value of the company, defined as the closing price for the fiscal year multiplied by the company's common shares outstanding (millions of dollars) and was used by authors like Datta, Datta and Raman (2005) ; LN (SALES) that is the natural logarithm of net annual sales as reported by the company, and that was used by authors like Elston and Goldberg (2003) and Aggarwall and Samwick (2003) and the LN (ASSETS) that is the natural logarithm of the total assets as reported by the company that was used by Anderson and Bizjack (2003) , Elston and Goldberg (2003) , Rogers(2002) , Fenn and Liang (2001) , Chen (2004) and Yermack ( 2004) . Some authors like Hallock (1997) , Sridharan (1996) , Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Bliss and Rosen (2001) , also use these variables without the natural logarithm. One of the problems in all these studies is that the authors use one of these variables at the expense of other variables. Researchers expect to receive better results by using one variable and not the others in a specific situation. But there is no sound reason for ignoring one variable and selecting another variable.
Because these variables are highly correlated, and can not be introduced at the same time to explain executive compensation, we used Principal Component Analysis to extract a factor that contains information from the three variables and solves this old problem of using size variable in executive compensation literature. 
......... We will use the natural logarithm of Firm Size Component to test the impact of firm size on total compensation, option ratio, and short term compensation of new and old economy firms.
We also used the variable LN(NOT EXERCIZED RATIO), which is the natural logarithm of the number of unexercised options that the executive held at year end that were vested divided by the aggregate number of stock options/stock appreciation rights granted to explain executive compensation. We expect that the number of options vested but not exercised has a negative relationship with total compensation and options ratio, meaning that if the executive has stock options that are not exercised, the firm will probably give fewer stock options in the future. We expect that effect will be more pronounced in new economy firms We also use the variable SHARE-RET-1Y, which is the one year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends. We expect that the return to shareholders will have a negative relationship with executive compensation because if the executive has enough return on investments, it is not necessary to give more compensation to executives to align shareholder interests with the interests of the executive.
We also use the variable LN (OWNERSHIP), which is the natural logarithm of the percentage of the company's shares owned by the named executive officer. This variable was used, with or without natural logarithm, by authors like, Core, Holthausen and Larker (1999) , Barron and Waddell (2003) and Chen (2004) . We expect, like the most part of previous research, that the percentage of the company shares owned by the executive will have a negative relationship with executive compensation. According to Chen and Hung (2006) , higher ownership indicates that managers' interests are more aligned with shareholders. Higher insider ownership is often considered to have a positive impact on corporate governance, and the more the managerial ownership, the less incentive pay they usually receive. This is also because if the executive has stock in the firm, he/she will already be more involved and concerned about improving the firm's stock price, and is not necessary to increase the incentives to reduce agency costs.
To measure the impact of the firm growth, we use the variable GROWTH-NI-5Y that is the 5-years least square annual growth rate of Net Income. Because new economy firms, according to the prior authors, have lower cash flows and give more stock options to executives, we expect that the net income will not be an important factor to explain executive compensation in new economy firms. In the case of old economy firms, we expect that this relationship will influence positively the total compensation.
To control for the effect of time, we use one dummy for each year between 1993 and 2004 like Barron and Waddel (2003) and Grinstein and Hribar (2004) . We expect that the dummy year will be significant in explaining executive compensation, particularly in the bubble To analyze the relationship between board members and executive compensation, we use the variable LN (NUMBER_MTGS) similar to Davidson III, Pilger and Szakmary (1998) , which is the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings held during the indicated fiscal year. The number of board meetings is related to the performance of the firm, and the ability of the executive to make decisions is affected by the number of meetings of the board during the year. According to Davidson, Pilger and Szakmary (1998) , board members are more aligned with shareholders´ interests when they have more meetings during the year. Because of that we expect a negative relationship between the number of meetings and executive compensation. Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003), Murphy (2003) and Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) are of the view that new economy companies differ from old economy companies because they present higher growth taxes of sales increase; they spend more money in research and development; they present low ratios of book-to-market value, reduced dividends per share and a high volatility of share returns. They still hold a smaller number of employees, a more reduced market value and smaller accounting returns than old economy firms. In addition, they provide a larger compensation proportion based on capital ownership, have a higher percentage of stock options and a higher percentage of the volume of stock options not exercised related to the total number of company shares.
V-Empirical results

Summary statistics
Our data also shows that new economy firms have smaller net incomes; the earning per share and the return on equity are smaller; the new economy executives are younger; the increase in net income and the yearly returns to shareholders are higher in new economy firms, and new economy firms have more board meetings, and on average, board members are paid more per board meeting.
B. Determinants of executive compensation in new and old economy firms
We now examine whether determinants of executive compensation, in new and old economy firms, are the same. We first test for correlations among independent variables, as discussed above, and find the values are relatively low. Tables 6 and 7 and general correlation of observations within a given cross section (Beck and Katz, 1995) . Adjusted R-Sq 86,12% 68,19% 64,22% * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level *** significant at 10% Note 1: Standard errors are corrected using period Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE): correction for both period heteroskedasticity and general correlation of observations within a given cross section (Beck and Katz, 1995 ) is the natural logarithm of Salary and Bonus. Ln(Option Ratio) is the natural logarithm of the value of options granted to the executive divided by total compensation. The independent variables are: FIRM SIZE COMPONENT is a vector that measure the firm size and is a combination of the LN (assets), LN(Market value) and LN(Sales) variables. Using these three variables and applying the Principal Component analysis, we extract a vector that is the best combination of these three variables to analyze the influence of firm size; LN(NOT EXERCISED RATIO) is the natural logarithm of the number of unexercised options that the executive held at year end that were vested divided by the aggregate number of stock options/stock appreciation rights granted; GROWTH_NI_5Y is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of net income; LN (BSVOLATILITY) is the natural logarithm of standard deviation volatility calculated over 60 days with Black Scholes method; LN (NUMBER_MTGS) is the natural logarithm of the number of the board meetings; LN (TENURE) is the natural logarithm of the number of years that CEO is doing the Job; LN (OWNERSHIP) is the natural logarithm of the percentage of the company shares owned by the executive. We also used a dummy year variable from 1993 to 2004 to control for the year effect. SHAREHOLD_RET is the one year return to shareholders. To distinguish between executives from new and old economy firms, we used the methodology of Murphy (2003) that considers firms from the new economy those with SIC code 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371 , 7372 e 7373 and firms from the old economy those with Sic code less than 4000 and not yet categorized with the new economy Adjusted R-Sq 87,42% 75,86% 76,79% * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level *** significant at 10%
.
Our results reveal that there are significant differences in factors that explain executive compensation in new versus old economy sub-samples, and generally these differences are statistically significant based on tests of equality of regression coefficients (table 9 and 10 appendix). We find that the factors that explain CEO compensation in new economy firms also explain the Director compensation in new economy firms but with smaller intensity. We observe the same phenomena in the old economy firms. We also find that the impact of the common factor (size) to explain executive compensation is significantly different for old versus new economy firms.
As expected, the firm's size is one of the most important variables that explains the executive compensation. In the case of the CEO's sub-sample, the size variable has a stronger impact on the executive compensation in new economy firms than the old economy firms. The difference in impact of the size variable on the executive compensation is statistically significant for new versus old economy firms. The results suggest that as the firm size increases, new economy executives receive more than executives from the old economy.
The firm size also influences the number of options granted to the executives in new and old economy firms, but the relationship is stronger in new economy firms. The results are congruent with the findings of Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003) , Murphy (2003) and Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) , Anderson, Banker, and Ravidran (2000) that new economy firms grant more stock options to executives.
Our results also reveal that cash compensation is more sensitive to firm size in old economy firms than new economy firms. That is, large companies from the old economy pay more in cash than new economy firms.
In the case of the directors, the relationship between firm size and compensation is similar to the relationship for the CEOs, but the intensity of the coefficients is smaller, meaning The one years return to shareholders is negatively related to the options granted to CEO in both new and old economy firms, and also in the case of new economy directors. In the case of old economy directors, it is negatively related to total compensation, option ratio and short term compensation, and the results are congruent with the theory that if shareholders are already satisfied with investment returns, they don't need to pay more to executive because your interests are aligned with executive's interest.
The increase in the firm's Net Income in the last five years doesn't affect CEOs executive compensation in new economy firms. In the case of CEO's and directors from the old economy, the influence is positive on total compensation. The results are congruent with Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2002) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) that find that CEOs are paid more in terms of performance than other executives and with Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2003) that new economy firms give stock options to executives because the firms have difficulty generating enough cash flow to pay high salaries to executives.
Like we expected, stock return volatility has a strong negative influence on the CEO's cash compensation in old economy firms and a less strong influence in old economy firms. Also in the case of the directors, the stock return volatility is negatively related with cash compensation in new and old economy firms, and the relationship is stronger in new economy firms. The results mean that if the volatility increases, firms will reward their executives with more stock options and less cash as incentives.
We also find that time has a positive effect on total compensation and options compensation.
V-Conclusion
We Our results also reveal that new economy executives receive more, on average, than executives from the old economy, but the difference reduces in the last sample years. In the bubble period, new economy executive compensation is composed of more than 50% of stock options and in the case of old economy firms with more than 30% of stock options. After that period, with the Nasdaq Crash and the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act we observe a significant change in the structure of the components of executive compensation -reducing the use of stock options and increasing the use of bonus and restricted stocks.
We also find that the factors that explain executive compensation in new and old economy firms are generally different, and in the case of the variables that are the same, our tests generally reject the hypothesis of the equality of regression coefficients related to these common factors. New economy total executive compensation is influenced by firm size, the ratio of the number of stock option vested but not exercised, and executive stock ownership. Old economy total executive compensation is influenced by firm size, executive ownership, one year total return to shareholders and 5 years annual growth rate of firm net income. 
